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TITLE IX AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS:
WHY DISCIPLINED-STUDENT LITIGATION DOES
NOT UNDERMINE THE ROLE OF TITLE IX
IN CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT
Erin E. Buzuvis*
I. INTRODUCTION
As an aspect of its prohibition on sex discrimination, Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972 requires educational institutions that
receive federal funding to engage in a “prompt and equitable” response to
reports of sexual harassment, including sexual violence.1 In the last five
years, the Department of Education has increased its efforts to enforce this
requirement, both resulting from and contributing to increased public atten-
tion to the widespread problem of sexual assault among students, particu-
larly in higher education.2 The increase in both enforcement and public at-
tention has motivated colleges and universities to improve their policies and
practices for addressing sexual assault, including their disciplinary
processes. More students are being disciplined as a result.3
Not surprisingly, this increase in discipline for sexual assault has cor-
related with an increase in litigation by students who have been disciplined
for sexual assault under Title IX.4 In some cases, disciplined-student plain-
tiffs have prevailed in overturning their punishment, causing many to sug-
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.
1. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2016).
2. To be sure, sexual assault also occurs among students in high school and younger, and the
Department of Education is increasingly investigating school districts’ policies and practices for ad-
dressing the problem. Emma Brown, Reporting a School Sexual Assault Can Increase Victim’s Risk of
Punishment, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/P4VT-BUJW. These cases, however, have
not given rise to reverse discrimination claims by disciplined students, which are the subject of this
Article. Accordingly, this Article focuses on the problem of campus sexual assault and the legal obliga-
tions of institutions of higher education.
3. See, e.g., University of Maryland Expels Record Number of Students for Sexual Assault, THE
DIAMONDBACK (Nov. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/B6E6-XX89 (noting a rise in the number of sexual
misconduct cases investigated by the University of Maryland and correlating it to an increase in the
number of students disciplined for such misconduct). For context, however, it is still the case that the
majority of disciplinary proceedings do not find respondents responsible, usually because of lack of
evidence. Moreover, less than half of respondents who are found responsible for sexual assault are
expelled; the majority receive suspension or some other punishment. Confronting Campus Sexual As-
sault: An Examination of Higher Education Claims, UNITED EDUCATORS, 10–12, https://perma.cc/
6NWY-ARX6 (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Confronting Campus Sexual Assault].
4. One article reports that 75 such cases have been filed since 2013: At Least 75 Men Suing
Colleges Over Unfair Sexual Allegation Repercussions, Discrimination, CBS NEW YORK (Mar. 23,
2016, 2:47 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/VU5K-TJCZ.
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gest that colleges and universities are “overcorrecting” for earlier deficien-
cies in their procedures that lead to under-enforcement of campus policies
banning sexual misconduct.5 Much of this rhetoric places blame on Title IX
for universities’ problems with compliance and calls, either implicitly or
expressly, for repeal of Title IX’s application to sexual assault.6
This framing of Title IX is both misleading and problematic. Individ-
ual stories and cases of procedural error and bias, or allegations of procedu-
ral error and bias, in sexual assault hearings are often presented as evidence
of a trend that universities have abandoned procedural fairness in order to
comply with the new requirements of Title IX. It does seem accurate to
suggest that litigation involving students disciplined for sexual assault oc-
curs more frequently today than before the present era of increased enforce-
ment, which effectively began when the Department of Education’s 2011
Dear Colleague Letter clarified the institutional response required under Ti-
tle IX to reports of sexual assault.7 Yet, by clarifying the government’s
expectations for colleges and universities under Title IX, the Dear Col-
league Letter motivates institutions to make sexual assault easier and more
comfortable for victims to report and to improve their policies and proce-
dures for addressing the reports of sexual assault that they receive. It is
possible, therefore, that students disciplined for sexual assault are just as
litigious as they were prior to the Dear Colleague Letter—there are simply
more of them today. This is not because of problems that the Letter caused;
rather, it is because of the problems it corrected.
Moreover, the cases in which disciplined students have succeeded on
the merits of their claims cannot serve as evidence of a widespread problem
without proper context. When contextualized, statistics place those victories
within the larger number of cases that universities win on motions to dis-
miss or summary judgment, the unknown number of cases in which univer-
sities impose discipline that is not litigated, and the additional unknown
number of cases in which campus disciplinary proceedings do not result in
discipline in the first place.8
5. Articles that use the word “overcorrection” include, for example: Emily Yoffe, The College
Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), https://perma.cc/WU5X-BNZL; Gregg Bern-
stein, An Overcorrection on Campus Sexual Assault Policies?, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 15, 2015,
6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/4DTL-LWFW; Max Kutner, The Other Side of the Sexual Assault Crisis,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 18, 2015, 5:33 AM), https://perma.cc/B8ST-JPVM.
6. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 5; Sarah Kuta, ‘Healthy outrage’ fuels attorney suing CU, other R
schools on behalf of men accused of sexual assault, DAILY CAMERA (Sept. 2, 2016, 9:54 AM MDT),
https://perma.cc/ECU2-RCMQ.
7. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, the Dep’t of Educ. Office for
Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Apr. 4, 2011), available at https://perma.cc/9DCF-H77S [hereinaf-
ter Dear Colleague Letter].
8. One source reports only 45% of disciplinary proceedings result in the accused student being
found responsible for sexual assault. Confronting Campus Sexual Assault, supra note 3, at 10. It further R
2
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Finally, the rhetoric of Title IX blame fails to recognize that in cases in
which disciplined students have prevailed, the winning arguments have not
been anti-male bias, which might suggest a problem that is systemic instead
of isolated. Nor have disciplined students prevailed on any procedural argu-
ment targeting anything that the Department of Education has required in-
stitutions to do as part of a Title IX-compliant response to sexual assault.
Nothing in Title IX requires or encourages colleges and universities to vio-
late the due process or contractual rights of students who are accused of
sexual assault.
This Article examines the recent spate of disciplined-student cases in
an effort to harmonize Title IX compliance with the procedural rights of
students who are accused of sexual assault. First, by way of background, it
describes and provides historical context for Title IX’s application to the
problem of sexual assault on college and university campuses, as well as the
requirements the law imposes on the educational institutions within its
scope. Next, it describes the role that Title IX plays in disciplined-student
cases themselves. As Part III illustrates, it is popular for disciplined-student
plaintiffs—who thus far have all been male—to argue that the college or
university’s decision to discipline them was tainted by “reverse” sex dis-
crimination prohibited by Title IX. However, even as some courts have de-
termined such claims meet the bare minimum of proper pleading, reverse
discrimination claims have yet to prevail on the merits. Part IV describes
how disciplined-student plaintiffs have had comparatively more success
challenging disciplinary procedures and outcomes using due process, ad-
ministrative law, and breach of contract claims. This Part also notes that
cases in which disciplined students have successfully argued due process,
administrative law, and breach of contract claims do not create legal obliga-
tions for defendant institutions that conflict with Title IX’s requirement to
engage in a prompt and equitable response to sexual assault on campus. For
these reasons, the Article argues in its final part that neither the fact of
litigation by disciplined students nor the examples of their occasional suc-
cess undermines Title IX and its application to sexual assault. Procedural
fairness is an important component of all campus disciplinary hearings, and
litigation is an appropriate response to ensure that universities do not com-
mit material errors in disciplining students for sexual assault. However,
such litigation should not be viewed as evidence of a problem with Title IX
notes that among students who are found responsible, most are sanctioned by something other than
expulsion. In cases where the accused is found responsible, the student is expelled 43% of the time. Id.
at 12; see also Tyler Kinkade, Fewer than One-Third of Campus Sexual Assault Cases Result in Expul-
sion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:59 AM EST), https://perma.cc/2N4Z-5N8H (reporting that
among students found responsible for sexual assault, only 30% are expelled).
3
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or a reason to withdraw universities’ responsibility to engage a prompt and
equitable response to campus sexual assault.
II. TITLE IX’S APPLICATION TO CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT
For those who have encountered Title IX only in the context of athlet-
ics, the statute’s application to campus sexual assault may seem like an odd
departure. In fact, Title IX imposes a general prohibition on sex discrimina-
tion onto educational institutions that receive any funding from the federal
government.9 That sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination has
been a well-settled matter since the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson.10 There, the Court ruled that unwelcome sex-
ual advances, when sufficiently severe or pervasive to render a workplace
environment hostile to members of one sex, constitute sex discrimination
under Title VII.11 Predictably, courts have since applied a similar interpre-
tation to Title IX, confirming that sexual harassment is actionable in the
educational context as well.12 Sexual assault is an obvious subset of sexual
harassment. It is by definition unwelcome, and because it often has the ef-
fect of interfering with a victim’s educational opportunities, it is also se-
vere.13
Title IX’s statutory language authorizes the Department of Education
to enforce its provisions and ensure that federal funding does not flow to
institutions that are in violation of the statute or its implementing regula-
tions.14 In addition, the Supreme Court has determined that the statute im-
plies a private right of action by which private litigants can sue educational
institutions in federal court to obtain relief,15 including money damages,16
for an institution’s violation of Title IX. Thus, the resulting system of dual
enforcement consists of both private and public mechanisms. Courts have
applied both mechanisms to colleges and universities in cases arising from
the sexual assault of one student by another.
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
10. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
11. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64.
12. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), aff’d, 631
F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that a claim “that academic advancement was conditioned upon
submission to sexual demands constitutes [a claim of] sex discrimination in education . . . .”).
13. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 444 F.3d 255, 268, 274 n.12 (4th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that a
single incident of sexual assault or rape could be sufficient to raise a jury question about whether a
hostile environment exists); Soper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that rape and
sexual abuse “obviously qualif[y] as . . . severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive sexual harass-
ment.”).
14. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
15. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 705–09 (1979).
16. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
4
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A. Judicial Enforcement of Title IX in Sexual Assault Cases
A student17 who is the victim of sexual harassment or assault at the
hands of another student (or an institutional employee) may sue the institu-
tion for damages.18 But institutional liability is not automatic in such cases.
The Supreme Court has insisted that only the institution’s own intentional,
unlawful conduct may give rise to a claim for damages under Title IX.19 An
institution will neither be liable for an unintentional or accidental misstep
that gives rise to or enables sexual harassment or assault nor will such lia-
bility inure on the sole grounds that someone over whom the institution had
control committed the offense in question.
The reason for this narrow scope of liability, the Court has reasoned, is
Title IX’s status as legislation passed pursuant to Congress’s power under
the Constitution’s Spending Clause. Congress does not have plenary power
to regulate educational institutions, but it does have the power to appropri-
ate federal funds.20 As an extension of this power, Congress routinely im-
poses conditions that obligate the recipients of such funding to comply with
requirements that Congress would not necessarily have the power to impose
directly. Thus, Title IX essentially operates as a bilateral agreement in
which educational institutions voluntarily agree to comply with the statute’s
nondiscrimination mandate in exchange for being eligible to partake in fed-
eral programs, such as student financial aid, that subsidize their operations.
Private plaintiffs, however, are not part of this agreement, so institutions
arguably lack notice of the fact that by accepting federal funding from the
government, they could be liable to a third party. Out of concern for fair-
ness to funding recipients, the Supreme Court has insisted that only their
intentional misconduct can give rise to such liability because intentional
misconduct—unlike accidents or vicarious liability—is entirely within the
institution’s power to prevent and control.21
17. Title IX protects male and female students alike. See, e.g., Yap v. N.W. Univ., 119 F. Supp. 3d
841, 849–52 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (refusing to dismiss claims that Northwestern failed to investigate allega-
tions by a male plaintiff that he was sexually harassed by a professor).
18. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 647–51 (1999). The same goes for cases
where harassment or assault is perpetrated by an institutional employee. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73–76.
19. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § VIII.
21. When Congress exercises legislative authority under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, it
makes federal funding available on condition that the recipient agree to certain terms, such as agreeing
not to engage in discrimination. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). The
Court’s explanation for limiting the scope of damages liability in such cases is that an institution that
makes that deal with the government does not necessarily expect to be liable for damages to anyone else.
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75; Davis, 526 U.S. at 641–42. Therefore, to ensure that the liability for
damages does not sneak up on an unsuspecting funding recipient, the remedy only applies to cases
involving intentional discrimination, as opposed to liability based on negligence or agency principles.
5
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In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court
held that an institution’s deliberate failure to respond to known harassment
is tantamount to intentional discrimination on the institution’s part, and thus
can be the basis of a plaintiff’s claim for money damages.  Since that time,
lower courts have articulated the standard for institutional liability in cases
of student-on-student sexual harassment and assault to require the plaintiff
to prove (1) that an appropriate person, or someone with authority, had
actual notice of sexual harassment or sexual assault, that (a) had occurred,
(b) was occurring, or (c) was threatened; (2) notwithstanding such notice,
that institution responded with deliberate indifference; and (3) the sexual
harassment was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it ef-
fectively bars the victim’s access to an educational opportunity or bene-
fit.”23 As noted above, the third requirement is easily satisfied in cases in-
volving sexual assault.24 The first two require fuller explanation.
1. Actual Notice
There are two possible grounds on which a university may be liable to
a plaintiff who was sexually assaulted by a peer or someone else under
institutional control. One possibility is that a university’s failure to respond
to a student’s report that sexual assault or other actionable harassment has
occurred may give rise to liability not for the assault itself, but for emo-
tional and economic damages occurring in its wake that are attributable to
the university’s nonresponse.25 Alternatively—or in addition—a university
may be liable for damages attributable to the sexual assault itself if the
plaintiff demonstrates that the university disregarded an “obvious” threat or
“substantial risk” that sexual misconduct would occur.26 The threat need not
be specific to the plaintiff; institutional knowledge of a respondent’s prior
rape of a student other than the plaintiff constitutes actual notice of the risk
22. 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999).
23. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633).
24. Soper, 195 F.3d at 854–55 (noting that rape “obviously qualifies as being severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive sexual harassment . . . .”).
25. See, e.g., Kinsman v. Fla. St. Univ. Bd. of Trs., No. 4:15CV-MW/CASTrustees, 2015 WL
11110848, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2015) (alleging in complaint that “between January 22, 2013, and
November 13, 2013, senior athletics officials took little, if any, action to investigate or respond to the
alleged rape of a student by another student in their charge . . . plausibly alleges deliberate indiffer-
ence.”).
26. Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[H]arassment of persons other
than the plaintiff may provide the school with the requisite notice to impose liability under Title IX.”);
Delgado v. Stegall, 367 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n Davis the Court required knowledge only of
‘acts of sexual harassment’ by the [harasser], not of previous acts directed against the particular plain-
tiff.”).
6
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or threat to others.27 Additionally, the threat need not be specific to the
respondent, as knowledge of prior sexual misconduct committed by others
may also constitute notice where the past and present incidents are con-
nected by a program-specific pattern. For example, a university could be
liable for rape committed by football recruits in light of its failure to re-
spond to known, prior incidents of sexual abuse that occurred within the
football recruiting program, even though the past incidents were perpetrated
by different recruits.28
2. Deliberate Indifference
Because it is the legal equivalent of intentional misconduct,29 the de-
liberate indifference standard is a difficult one for plaintiffs to satisfy. Ordi-
nary mistakes do not qualify, even if they cause injury, or further injury, to
the plaintiff. Rather, the institutional response—or the lack of response—
must be “clearly unreasonable” in light of the known circumstances.30 The
complete absence of any investigative or disciplinary response will often
satisfy the standard,31 but not always. For example, one court determined
that the deliberate indifference standard insulated a university that made no
effort to address or investigate a student’s reported rape because of its good
faith belief that doing so would hamper the ongoing efforts of law enforce-
ment.32 Another court determined that deliberate indifference could not ex-
27. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1296 (finding a basis for institutional liability where plaintiff alleged that
athletic officials at the University of Georgia knew about an athlete’s prior history of sexual misconduct
when they recruited him to the football team and then failed to supervise him or take other precautions
to address the threat of rape that athlete later committed against the plaintiff). In contrast, a university’s
knowledge of the perpetrator’s abusive and intimidating tendencies towards his roommate generally did
not qualify as actual notice of an obvious risk of sexual violence. Frazer v. Temple Univ., 25 F. Supp. 3d
598 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
28. Compare Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2007), and
Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., No. 3:16-CV-199, 2016 WL 2595795, at *13 (M.D. Tenn. May 3, 2016) (deny-
ing the University of Tennessee’s motion to dismiss, where the plaintiff had alleged that university
officials had “notice of a specific and concrete pattern of an ‘inordinate’ number of sexual assault
allegations against members of specific teams within the UT Athletic Department.”), with Doe v. Black-
burn Coll., No. 06-3205, 2012 WL 640046, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2012) (determining that university
did not have actual notice of threat to the plaintiff of being raped by an unknown perpetrator based on
prior incidents of sexual assault that involved separate, known perpetrators).
29. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 642 (reasoning that deliberate indifference is intentional discrimination).
30. E.g., Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, No. 14-CV-484-TCK-PJC, 2016 WL 1545138, at *14 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 15, 2016).
31. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 700 (4th Cir. 2007) (deliberate indifference could be
satisfied by evidence that university official dismissed plaintiff’s complaint about sexual harassment by
her coach, telling her that that coach was a “great guy and that she should work out her problems
directly with him.”); see also Univ. of Tenn., 2016 WL 2595795 (denying university’s motion to dismiss
where plaintiff alleged nonresponse); McGrath v. Dominican Coll. of Blauvelt, N.Y., 672 F. Supp. 2d
477 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
32. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 15-CV-05779-RS, 2016 WL 2961984 (N.D. Cal.
May 23, 2016).
7
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ist where the university’s nonresponse to a known report of rape was justi-
fied by the plaintiff’s failure to file a formal complaint.33
Courts are unwilling to treat violations of university policy as tanta-
mount to deliberate indifference.34 Even violations of policies promulgated
by the Department of Education that govern administrative enforcement of
Title IX do not automatically qualify as deliberate indifference.35 On the
other hand, one plaintiff successfully alleged deliberate indifference by
claiming that university officials downgraded a sexual assault sanction from
expulsion to suspension because of the perpetrator’s status as an athlete.36
Thus, a university may be liable for an incomplete or insufficient response
under circumstances from which a jury could infer that university officials
deliberately watered down grievance procedures or the respondent’s sanc-
tion.
As a result of the high burden that the deliberate indifference standard
places on plaintiffs, private enforcement can only address the most egre-
gious examples of institutional inaction. Litigation, therefore, has a limited
ability to motivate institutions to address sexual assault, which may be diffi-
cult and costly to the institution’s reputation. Importantly, however, as the
next subpart explains, government regulators may enforce Title IX against a
wider range of institutional misconduct—an effort to which the Department
of Education has devoted considerable attention in the last five years.
33. Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 883 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Ross, 2016 WL 1545138, at
*14 (“Campus security officers and school administrators walk a fine line when they investigate a report
of sexual assault by a victim who is unwilling to proceed or make any specific accusations. [Plaintiff]
had one semester left of school and did not want any disruption of her life prior to her graduation.
Interviewing [Plaintiff’s friend and Respondent], and other members of the small University of Tulsa
(TU) campus or ultimately taking action against [Respondent] would undoubtedly have caused this type
of unwanted disruption. While perhaps not in accordance with Title IX best practices or the OCR’s
guidance in the DCL, TU’s response [to Plaintiff’s report] could not be deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’
in light of the nature of such report.”). But see Butters v. James Madison Univ., 145 F. Supp. 3d 610
(W.D. Va. 2015) (denying motion to dismiss where university justified its alleged failure to respond on
complainant’s unwillingness to file a formal complaint).
34. Facchetti v. Bridgewater Coll., 175 F. Supp. 3d 627 (W.D. Va. 2016) (concluding that plaintiff
did not sufficiently allege deliberate indifference even though her complaint alleged that the university
violated its own policy by deterring her from reporting the matter to the police, failing to advise her of
her rights, preventing her from presenting witnesses, and excluding her from information about the
disciplinary process); Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of the Neb. St. Colls., No. 8:12-CV-412, 2015 WL
4546712, at *14 (D. Neb. July 28, 2015), aff’d, No. 15-2972, 2016 WL 3564252 (8th Cir. July 1, 2016)
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that university’s failure to ensure that student accused of rape and murder
completed sanctions for earlier acts of misconduct was deliberate indifference).
35. Moore, 2016 WL 2961984, at *7–8 (concluding that failure to provide housing or academic
accommodations did not constitute deliberate indifference).
36. Doe v. Univ. of Ala. in Huntsville, No. 5:14-CV-02029-HGD, 2016 WL 1270605 (N.D. Ala.
Mar. 31, 2016).
8
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B. Administrative Enforcement of Title IX in Sexual Assault Cases
Because Title IX is a spending condition, the Department of Education
enforces Title IX by leveraging an institution’s federal funding, although
the Department has never withdrawn funding from an institution for non-
compliance. Generally, institutions found to be in violation of Title IX are
motivated by the threat of funding withdrawal to enter into a resolution
agreement with the agency that promises corrective action.37 Unlike claims
by private plaintiffs, government enforcement raises no concerns about the
fairness of exposing funding recipients to third-party liability. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court’s insistence on an institution-friendly standard of liabil-
ity, one that requires the plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination or its
equivalent, deliberate indifference, does not apply. Because the Department
of Education, in contrast, is focused on prospective relief, it has more lee-
way to impose obligations on an institution that go well beyond simply
ensuring the absence of deliberate indifference.
To many, the Office of Civil Rights’ (OCR) attention to campus sexual
assault appears a recent development. In fact, the agency has long consid-
ered Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination to cover sexual harass-
ment, including sexual violence. In a 1997 guidance document, OCR ad-
dressed the requirement in its 1975 regulations that institutions adopt griev-
ance procedures that provide for a “prompt and equitable resolution” of sex
37. As counterexamples to the voluntary resolutions that are commonplace today, federal funding
recipients in the past have refused to cooperate with the efforts of the Department of Education and its
predecessor to enforce Title IX, resulting in the adjudications by or attempted by the agency in an effort
to terminate their federal funds. One group of recipients challenged the agency’s jurisdiction to enforce
Title IX on the basis of indirect funding received via student loan programs, as well as the application of
Title IX to parts of the university beyond the federally funded program itself. See Grove City Coll. v.
Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253, 256 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (overturning administrative law judge’s findings that
funding recipient failed to comply with agency’s requirement to submit an assurance of compliance);
Hillsdale Coll. v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 696 F.2d 418, 420 (6th Cir. 1982) (same); Univ. of
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Va. 1982) (enjoining agency from continuing enforce-
ment proceeding against institution that failed to submit to agency investigation). Another group of
institutions challenged the agency’s authority under Title IX to regulate employment practices. Romeo
Cnty. Sch. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Ed., & Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (en-
joining agency from continuing enforcement proceeding); Brunswick Sch. Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp.
866, 869 (D. Me. 1978) (same); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Califano, No. N-78-165, 1979 WL 285, at *1
(D. Conn. Apr. 24, 1979) (same). All of the institutions in both groups successfully appealed or enjoined
the agency’s adjudication and thus preserved their federal funding. Notably, however, the arguments
successfully advanced by the recipients in these cases are no longer viable today as a result of interven-
ing legislation and case law. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (confirming the
agency’s authority under Title IX to regulate employment practices; Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555, 573 (1984) (confirming that federal student aid programs constitute federal assistance to the institu-
tion but only subject the college’s financial aid program to Title IX); Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1647 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 d-4a (2012) (amending Title IX to cover entire institu-
tions and not only the specific program that receives federal funds).
9
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discrimination complaints38 and confirmed that this includes complaints
about sexual harassment.39 The guidance clarified institutions’ obligations
to respond to reports of sexual harassment by taking “immediate and appro-
priate steps” to investigate or otherwise determine what occurred, followed
by “steps reasonably calculated” to end any harassment, eliminate a hostile
environment if one has been created, prevent harassment from occurring
again, and to remedy the effects of harassment on the affected individual.40
OCR otherwise avoided imposing specific and uniform requirements on di-
verse educational institutions, preferring instead a case-by-case evaluation
of “prompt and equitable” that maximizes institutions’ flexibility to create
procedures best suited to its needs.
Over the years, however, OCR has issued several guidance documents
that clarify how it intends to exercise its authority to enforce the “prompt
and equitable” requirement. In 2001, OCR reiterated this standard for deter-
mining noncompliance, confirming that it remained unchanged by the
Court’s then-recent adoption of a deliberate indifference standard for law-
suits seeking money damages.41 As the agency explained, the Court’s desire
to ensure that funding recipients were not penalized without notice of the
risk of liability to third parties does not apply to government enforcement
since OCR provides funding recipients with notice and the opportunity to
take corrective action before terminating funding.42
Ten years later, OCR expounded on the 2001 Guidance in a Dear Col-
league Letter released on April 4, 2011.43 In the wake of increased public
attention to the problem of sexual assault on college campuses44 and lack-
luster response by university officials, the Dear Colleague Letter was partic-
ularly focused on aspects of the prior guidance that were proving challeng-
ing to institutions in cases involving sexual violence. OCR’s own enforce-
ment efforts that preceded the Dear Colleague Letter addressed examples of
universities improperly delegating their investigation responsibilities to lo-
38. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2016). Other relevant regulatory provisions include 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a)
(2016) (requiring funding recipients to designate an employee responsible for Title IX compliance, in-
cluding investigating internal complaints about sex discrimination) and 34 C.F.R. § 106.9 (2016) (con-
taining specific requirements about the notice and dissemination of those procedures).
39. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students,
or Third Parties, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1997), https://perma.cc/6YEW-HQVZ
[hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance].
40. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 39. R
41. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (Jan. 2001), https://perma.cc/
82CH-2LRT [hereinafter Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance].
42. Id. iii–iv.
43. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 7. R
44. Christopher P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual Assault (CSA) Study: Final Report, NAT’L
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., xiii (Oct. 2007), https://perma.cc/7DEK-9A9T.
10
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cal law enforcement; imposing watered-down or no sanctions on responsi-
ble parties; discouraging victims from filing complaints—sometimes by
pressuring them into informal mediation; excluding victims from discipli-
nary hearings; imposing an evidentiary standard that overprotects perpetra-
tors;45 prohibiting victims from speaking about the matter; and failing to
inform victims of investigation outcomes.46
OCR addressed these and other patterns of noncompliance in the Dear
Colleague Letter. The Letter clarified that a university’s duty to conduct an
“adequate, reliable, and impartial” investigation47 was not satisfied by the
investigatory efforts of local law enforcement, which determines the possi-
bility of a criminal response rather than protecting the victim’s civil
rights.48 Nor may a university altogether avoid investigation when the al-
leged victim refuses to file a complaint or openly participate in a discipli-
nary proceeding. Even though it is not appropriate to impose sanctions on
an alleged perpetrator whose victim does not testify, the duty to respond to
sexual assault extends beyond efforts to identify and discipline the perpetra-
tor, as the university must pursue “other steps to limit the effects of the
alleged harassment and prevent its recurrence.”49 Such obligations include
providing support and accommodations for the victim, as well as engaging
the community in prevention and training efforts.50
45. E.g., Letter from Howard Kallem, Office for Civil Rights, to Jane E. Genster, Georgetown
Univ., Re: OCR Complaint No. 11-03-2017 (Oct. 16, 2003) (“In order for a recipient’s sexual harass-
ment grievance procedure to be consistent with Title IX standards, the recipient must draw conclusions
about whether particular conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment using a preponderance of the
evidence standard.”), available at https://perma.cc/B5D9-MTSH; see also Katherine K. Baker et al.,
Title IX and the Preponderance of the Evidence: A White Paper, 9–10, https://perma.cc/3VS4-CHK4
(last visited Oct. 27, 2016) (describing other examples of earlier enforcement actions that corrected
institution’s erroneous use of standards of proof higher than preponderance).
46. Kristen Lomardi, Sexual Assault on Campus Shrouded in Secrecy, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEG-
RITY (Dec. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/VJ9B-Y9DH.
47. Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 41, at 20. R
48. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 7, at 10. R
49. Id. at 5. The Letter also explains that in serious cases, an institution should not let the victim’s
request for confidentiality limit the university’s response in ways that jeopardize the safety of the com-
munity.
50. Id. at 16–17. A subsequent guidance clarified this point even further. Examples include provid-
ing increased monitoring, supervision, or security at locations or activities where the misconduct oc-
curred; providing training and education materials for students and employees; changing and publicizing
the school’s policies on sexual violence; and conducting climate surveys regarding sexual violence. In
instances affecting many students, an alleged perpetrator can be put on notice of allegations of harassing
behavior and be counseled appropriately without revealing, even indirectly, the identity of the student
complainant. A school must also take immediate action as necessary to protect the student while keeping
the identity of the student confidential. These actions may include providing support services to the
student and changing living arrangements or course schedules, assignments, or tests. See Questions and
Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 20 (2014), https://
perma.cc/WQ5V-989R (last visited October 27, 2016) [hereinafter Questions and Answers on Title IX
and Sexual Violence].
11
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The Dear Colleague Letter also addressed compliance with the regula-
tory requirement for a “prompt and equitable” response, including an equi-
table grievance procedure. For example, the Letter put institutions on notice
of OCR’s expectation that Title IX-compliant institutions will employ a
preponderance standard of evidence, which asks, “Is it more likely than not
that sexual violence occurred?” The Letter noted that the preponderance
standard is consistently used by courts and agencies in civil rights cases.51
Standards that heighten the institution’s burden of proof, such as a “clear
and convincing” or “beyond a reasonable doubt,” increase the likelihood
that sexual assault will not be adequately addressed and its recurrence pre-
vented.52 Besides employing a preponderance standard, an equitable pro-
ceeding also ensures that both the complainant and the respondent have the
same access to information used at the hearing, as well as the same opportu-
nities to present evidence. The Dear Colleague Letter is agnostic as to the
specific procedures that a grievance proceeding must employ; its emphasis
is only on the symmetrical application of those procedures to the respondent
and complainant.53 Other aspects of the Letter provide a sixty-day guideline
for the prompt completion of an investigation,54 clarify the institution’s ob-
ligation to take interim measures to protect the complainant while the inves-
tigation and grievance procedure is pending,55 and suggest possible steps
that institutions might take to “address the effects” of sexual harassment.56
In the wake of the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, the number of com-
plaints to OCR regarding a college or university’s response to sexual vio-
lence has risen considerably with every year.57 The agency has resolved
51. Id. at 10–11.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 11–12 (“For example, a school should not conduct a pre-hearing meeting during which
only the alleged perpetrator is present and given an opportunity to present his or her side of the story,
unless a similar meeting takes place with the complainant; a hearing officer or disciplinary board should
not allow only the alleged perpetrator to present character witnesses at a hearing; and a school should
not allow the alleged perpetrator to review the complainant’s statement without also allowing the com-
plainant to review the alleged perpetrator’s statement.”). Though the DCL applies that same agnosticism
to the question of whether institutions should permit parties to be represented by attorneys, the regula-
tions implementing the Campus SaVE Act prohibit them from restricting parties’ access to the represen-
tative of their choice.
54. Id. at 12 (“Based on OCR experience, a typical investigation takes approximately 60 calendar
days following receipt of the complaint. Whether OCR considers complaint resolutions to be timely,
however, will vary depending on the complexity of the investigation and the severity and extent of the
harassment.”).
55. Id. at 15–16 (suggesting a no-contact order, for example, and that any required changes in
housing or class schedule minimize disruption to the complainant).
56. Id. at 16–17 (suggesting counseling and academic accommodations as examples).
57. Here are the number of complaints challenging colleges’ and universities’ response to sexual
violence that OCR has received in each fiscal year since 2009 (the year OCR began keeping track of
complaints pertaining to specifically sexual violence).
12
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only a fraction of these complaints, however. 58 In so doing, the agency has 
uncovered and addressed violations based on egregious delay in conducting 
investigations and concluding the disciplinary process;59 excluding the 
complainant from participating in the appeal;60 restricting the complain-
ant's, but not the respondent's, opportunity to submit character evidence;61 
fai ling to use the preponderance standard;62 failing to investigate a student 's 
complaint of ongoing sexual assault by a professor;63 fai ling to address har-
assment or retaliation directed at complainants;64 fai ling to pursue a non-
disciplinary response after a disciplinary response was precluded by the vic-
FY '09 II 
FY '10 II 
FY 'II 16 
FY '12 16 
FY '13 33 
FY '14 106 
FY '15 164 
Delivering Justice: Report to the President and Secretary of Education Fiscal Year 2015, DEP'T OF 
Eouc. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, II fig.9 (2016), https://perma.cc/MV3C-BNQS. 
58. Title IX: Tracking Sexual Assau/J investigations, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER Eouc., https://perma 
.cc/AQG2-KFE6 (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). The Chronicle of Higher Education is tracking OCR's 
enforcement efforts and reports that the agency has resolved 55 of the 336 investigations into universi-
ties' response to sexual assault since the Dear Colleague Letter's release in April 2011. 
59. Harvard Law School Foulld in Violation of Title IX, Agrees to Remedy Sexual Harassment, 
including Sexual Assault of Students, U.S. DEP'T OF Eouc. (December 30, 2014), https://perma.cc/ 
C4P5-X59T (Harvard Law School); Letter from Meena Morey Chandra, Director, U.S. Dep't of Educ. 
Office for Civil Rights, Region XV, to Kristine Zayko, Deputy General Counsel, Office of the General 
Counsel, Michigan State University, Re: OCR Docket# 15-11-2098 alld #15-14-2113, 16 (Sept. I, 
2015), available at https://perma.cc/F2FR-D4YV (Michigan State University) [hereinafter Letter from 
Meena Morey Chandra]; Princeton University Found in Violation of Title IX, Reaches Agreement with 
U.S. Education Department to Address, Prevent Sexual Assault alld Harassment of Students, U.S. DEP'T 
OF Eouc. (Nov. 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/K5XP-J9J4 (Princeton University). 
60. Letter from Joel J. Berner, Regional Director, U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, 
Region I , to Martha C. Minow, Dean, Harvard Law School, Re: Complaint No. 01-11-2002, 10-11 
(Dec. 30, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/235K-2G3G (Harvard Law School) [hereinafter Letter 
from Joel J . Berner]. 
61. Letter from Timothy C.J. Blanchard, Director, U.S. Dep't ofEduc. Office for Civil Rights, New 
York Office, to Christopher L. Eisgruber, President, Princeton University, Re: Case No. 02-11-2065, 10 
(Nov. 5, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/533A-HRX8 (Princeton University) [hereinafter Letter 
from Timothy C.J. Blanchard). 
62. /d. at II. 
63. Letter from Adele Rapport, Regional Director, U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, 
Region V, to Dr. Steven Shirley, President, Minot State University, Re: OCR #05-14-2061, 15 (July 7, 
2016), available at https://perma.cc/D4UL-49KH (Minot State University). 
64. Letter from Meena Morey Chandra, supra note 59, at 3; Letter from Taylor D. August, Re-
gional Director, U.S. Dep't of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Region VI, to Dr. R. Gerald Turner, Presi-
dent, Southern Methodist University, Re: OCR Case Nos. 06-11-2126, 06-13-2081, and 06-13-2088, 
10-13 (Dec. II , 2014), available at https://perma.cc/8Y8P-SKZ2 (Southern Methodist University) 
[hereinafter Letter from Taylor D. August]. 
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tim’s noncooperation;65 failing to provide interim measures to ensure the
complainant’s safety;66 and failing to post or disseminate a Title IX-compli-
ant policy and grievance procedure.67 As noted above, the agency has yet to
withdraw federal funding from institutions that have violated Title IX, but
the agency has instead used its enforcement authority to extract compliance
agreements from those universities. Such agreements require training, pol-
icy revision, memoranda of understanding with local law enforcement, cli-
mate checks, reviewing past complaints, and taking necessary action to as-
sist complainants.
By increasing its level of oversight over the last five years, OCR has
motivated colleges and universities to engage in more thorough, compre-
hensive, and balanced responses to the problem of sexual assault on cam-
pus. Many more institutions today comply with the requirement to identify
an employee responsible for the institution’s Title IX compliance than have
in the past.68 Reporting mechanisms are easier for victims to find and un-
derstand, and complainants understand their rights to participate in any dis-
ciplinary process, to accommodations and support, and to protection from
further harassment and retaliation. A likely result of this may be that vic-
tims are reporting sexual assaults with increasing frequency,69 causing an
increase in the number of disciplinary proceedings and the number of stu-
65. Letter from Alice B. Wender, Regional Office Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil
Rights, Region XI, to Teresa A. Sullivan, President, University of Virginia, Re: OCR Review No. 11-11-
6001 Letter of Finding, 19 (Aug. 31, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/X8CC-ND67 (University of
Virginia); Letter from Thomas J. Hibino, Regional Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil Rights,
Region I, to Anthony P. Monaco, President, Tufts University, Re: Complaint No. 01-10-2089, 10 (Apr.
28, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/W8RY-PEVL (Tufts University) [hereinafter Letter from
Thomas J. Hibino].
66. Letter from Thomas J. Hibino, supra note 65, at 10 (Tufts University). R
67. Letter from Joel J. Berner, supra note 60, at 10 (Harvard Law School); Letter from Alice B. R
Wender, Regional Office Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Region XI, to Teresa A.
Sullivan, President, University of Virginia, Re: OCR Review No. 11-11-6001 Letter of Finding 7, 22
(Sept. 21, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/U3BH-W6Y5 (University of Virginia); Letter from
Meena Morey Chandra, Regional Office Director, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, Region
XV, to Dr. Michael V. Drake, President, Ohio State University, Re: OCR Docket #15-10-6002, 1, 9
(Sept. 11, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/TYV6-X5XR (Ohio State University); Letter from
Anurima Bhargaya, Chief, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Educational Opportunities
Section, and Gary Jackson, Regional Director, U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights,
Seattle Office, to President Royce Engstrom, President, the University of Montana, and Lucy France,
Esq., University Counsel, the University of Montana, Re: DOJ Case No. DJ 169-44-9, OCR Case No.
10126001, 7–10 (May 9, 2013), available at https://perma.cc/6SL7-PMV9 (University of Montana);
Letter from Taylor D. August, supra note 64, at 2 (Southern Methodist University). R
68. See, e.g., Jake New, Title IX Coordinators Required, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://perma.cc/ARP6-MZTL.
69. See, e.g., Monica Wang, Title IX Report Shows Highest Ever Number of Complaints, YALE
DAILY NEWS (Feb. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/56DU-9LGA; Yoffe, supra note 5 (describing the in- R
crease in reporting on campus sexual assault and attributing it to “a greater willingness on the part of
women to make complaints, not an increase in incidence”).
14
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dents disciplined for sexual assault. Given that disciplined students have a
long history of challenging the processes and outcomes by which they were
suspended or expelled for misconduct, including sexual assault, it is not
surprising that the number of cases brought by disciplined students, as well
as the number of cases won, appears to have increased as well.70 The next
Part examines the role that Title IX is playing in these cases.
III. TITLE IX’S APPLICATION TO STUDENT DISCIPLINE
Title IX not only obligates federally funded educational institutions to
respond to complaints of sex discrimination, including sexual harassment
and sexual violence, it also prohibits them from discriminating against stu-
dents on the basis of sex when imposing discipline for violations of univer-
sity policy, including sexual misconduct.71 Historically, OCR has not had
much opportunity to enforce this aspect of Title IX. Rather, the federal
courts have served as the primary venue for challenges to alleged sex dis-
crimination against students disciplined for sexual assault. Most of the judi-
cial decisions in disciplined-student cases have occurred in the wake of the
2011 Dear Colleague Letter. This trend is likely explained, at least in part,
by increased reporting of sexual assault and the corresponding increase in
the number of students disciplined, which is itself a result of universities
suspending earlier practices (such as those discussed above)72 that did not
comply with the clarifications to Title IX that the Dear Colleague Letter
contained. Courts have considered disciplined students’ Title IX claims us-
ing a variety of theories of liability. The two most widely used are the erro-
neous outcome and selective enforcement frameworks developed by the
Second Circuit in an early case called Yusuf v. Vassar College.73 Less fre-
quently, courts have considered frameworks labeled deliberate indifference
and disparate impact.
No plaintiff has prevailed on a Title IX claim against a university de-
fendant in a student discipline case. In contrast, many university defendants
have prevailed on motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for insufficient
pleading, though courts have permitted disciplined-student plaintiffs’ Title
IX claims to proceed to the discovery phase. Plaintiffs who have survived a
motion to dismiss may be in a position to procure a settlement, as Dezmine
70. Jake New, Court Wins for the Accused, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/
53SS-G2JK.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). Student discipline is not expressly mentioned, but the statute’s gen-
eral ban on sex discrimination in educational programs covers student discipline.
72. See supra Part II.B.
73. 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994).
15
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Wells did in his case against Xavier University.74 On the other hand, uni-
versity defendants have prevailed on summary judgment in Title IX cases
on the grounds that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient material evidence
in support of his allegations to warrant a trial.75
A. Erroneous Outcome
In erroneous outcome cases, the plaintiff argues that gender bias in the
disciplinary process produced mistaken results. There are two elements to
an erroneous outcome case: error and bias.
1. Error
A plaintiff in a disciplined-student case must first cast doubt on the
outcome of the disciplinary proceeding by identifying a procedural or sub-
stantive error.76 Examples of successfully alleged errors include: that the
adjudicator, whether an investigator, hearing panel, or reviewing dean,
reached conclusions that ran contrary to the weight of the evidence;77 that
the plaintiff (then “respondent”) had an unduly limited opportunity to pre-
sent his case to the adjudicator;78 that the respondent was not provided ac-
cess to evidence that would be raised in the hearing or other information
about his procedural rights at the hearing;79 and that the investigator omit-
ted exculpatory evidence from the investigator’s report or failed to follow
potentially exculpatory leads.80 If a plaintiff potentially reached a jury on an
74. Collin Binkley et al., Few rights for either side in college judicial procedures, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (November 25, 2014, 9:45 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/E74D-EFAT (noting the settlement
between Wells and Xavier University).
75. E.g., Mallory v. Ohio Univ., 76 F. App’x 634, 639 (6th Cir. 2003); Xiaolu Peter Yu v. Vassar
Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
76. Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
77. Compare Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 194 (D.R.I. 2016), and Doe v. Columbia
Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2016), with Prasad v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-CV-322, 2016 WL
3212079, at *15–16 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016).
78. Doe v. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d 748, 769 (D. Md. 2015) (finding that alleged limits
placed on the respondent’s opportunity to question the complainant could, if proven, call the proceed-
ing’s outcome into doubt); Doe v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *8–10 (D. Mass. July
14, 2015) (finding that alleged limits placed on the respondent’s ability to cross-examine witnesses, as
well as the decision to exclude some documentary evidence he wished to introduce, could, if proven,
call the proceeding’s outcome into doubt). But see Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 465 (rejecting plaintiff’s argu-
ment that cutting short his cross-examining led to an erroneous outcome, where hearing officer had
testified in deposition that he would cut off Yu’s questioning where answers to those questions had
already been given and further questioning would be redundant).
79. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 50 (failing to inform the respondent of his procedural rights);
Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 766 (withholding witness lists and witness statements from respon-
dent).
80. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 52; Prasad, 2016 WL 3212079, at *15–16; Univ. of Mass.-Am-
herst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *8–10; Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 766. Even when the investigator
16
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erroneous outcome claim, errors like these are capable of convincing a jury
to doubt the outcome of the process by which the plaintiff was disci-
plined.81
2. Bias
Secondly, a plaintiff in an erroneous outcome case must also prove
that the procedural or substantive error was the result of gender bias. As in
other discrimination cases, the gender bias element of an erroneous out-
come claim can be established by direct evidence, such as discriminatory
remarks made by administrators who participated in the disciplinary pro-
cess. The gender bias element can also be established through circumstan-
tial evidence, such as dissimilar treatment of male and female respondents
or a pattern in which men who are accused of sexual assault are “invariably
found guilty.”82
In some recent cases, plaintiffs have failed to support allegations of
gender bias, resulting in dismissal for failure to state a claim.83 In other
cases, however, courts have addressed the question of what constitutes a
sufficient allegation of gender bias. In Yusuf, the leading Second Circuit
decision established and applied the erroneous outcome framework to con-
clude the plaintiff’s allegation that men are “invariably found guilty” by
is not assigned an adjudicatory role, plaintiffs have successfully alleged that investigator error calls the
outcome into doubt, in circumstances where the respondent’s opportunity to question the report at the
adjudicatory hearing was limited. E.g., Prasad, 2016 WL 3212079, at *16 (concluding that because
Cornell’s disciplinary hearing process provides little opportunity for a respondent to challenge the find-
ings in the investigators report, the plaintiff’s claim that the report was deficient called the proceeding’s
outcome into question). On the other hand, one plaintiff was unable to support his allegations of investi-
gation errors and omissions with evidence, leading to his case’s dismissal on summary judgment. Yu, 97
F. Supp. 3d at 466 (“Yu claims that the Investigator Report (i) ‘cherry pick[ed]’ statements from each
witness without providing their full context; (ii) took [Complainant’s] statements as true; (iii) glossed
over [Complainant’s] unexplained inconsistencies; and (iv) framed the statements in a way that reflected
his own biased decision that [Yu] was guilty . . . . Yu points to no specific facts, however, to support
these conclusory allegations.”).
81. However, courts are unwilling to hold even demonstrable errors against a university if the
plaintiff neglected to exercise a right of appeal, which would have presumably given the university the
opportunity to correct those errors in the first place. Peloe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:14-CV-404,
2015 WL 728309, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2015).
82. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2015 WL 728309, at *14; Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d
243, 250 (2d Cir.1995).
83. Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 485; Doe v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs., 8:15-CV-682-T-30EAJ, 2015 WL
3453753 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2015); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2015),
vacated, 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016); Marshall v. Ohio Univ., 2:15-CV-775, 2015 WL 1179955 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 19, 2015); Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Mich. 2015), vacated (Sept. 30,
2015), appeal dismissed (Oct. 1, 2015) (though the plaintiff was able to continue to litigate part of his
due process claim); Blank v. Knox Coll., 14-CV-1386, 2015 WL 328602 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2015);
Harris v. St. Joseph’s Univ., 2014 WL 1910242 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2014) (though the plaintiff was able
to continue to litigate his defamation claim); Doe v. Univ. of the S., 687 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Tenn.
2009) (though the plaintiff eventually prevailed on negligence and breach of contract claims).
17
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Vassar’s disciplinary process was a sufficient allegation of gender bias, and
therefore the plaintiff should have had the opportunity to prove that it was
true.84
Since the 1994 decision in Yusuf, however, the Supreme Court has
clarified the pleading standard for civil rights plaintiffs. In its 2009 decision
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,85 the Court made clear that a complaint must include
more than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, sup-
ported by mere conclusory statements.” Rather, a plaintiff must plead spe-
cific facts sufficient to support a plausible inference that the defendant is
liable for the alleged misconduct.86 Citing Iqbal, some contemporary courts
in erroneous outcome cases have dismissed plaintiffs’ complaints alleging
bias by invoking the “men are invariably found guilty” language that was
sufficient when the Second Circuit decided Yusuf.87 Other courts, however,
have taken the opposite view, concluding that allegations identical to
Yusuf’s create a plausible inference of discrimination that is sufficient at
the pleading stage.88 These decisions are arguably bolstered by a recent
Second Circuit decision that reinstated an erroneous outcome claim against
Columbia University. In Doe v. Columbia University,89 the court reconciled
the Iqbal pleading standard with the 1973 Supreme Court decision McDon-
nell Douglas v. Green,90 which allows plaintiffs alleging discrimination
with minimal, circumstantial evidence to benefit from a temporary pre-
sumption of the defendant’s discriminatory motive.91 Reading Iqbal to-
gether with McDonnell Douglas, the Second Circuit concluded that a plain-
tiff could survive a motion to dismiss where the complaint specifically al-
leged facts that support a “minimal plausible inference” of discriminatory
intent.92 The Second Circuit did not have an opportunity in the Columbia
84. 35 F.3d at 713.
85. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
86. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
87. Tanyi v. Appalachian St. Univ., 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853 (W.D.N.C. July 22,
2015) (specifically noting that allegations like Yusuf’s do not satisfy today’s higher standard for more
specific pleading in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal).
88. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 53–56; see also Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (denying the
university’s motion to dismiss and reasoning that requiring the plaintiff to allege anything more specific
than “men are invariably found guilty” at the pleading stage would be to prematurely impose the burden
tantamount to the summary judgment standard); Prasad, 2016 WL 3212079, at *17 (finding that plain-
tiff’s allegation that men are “invariably found guilty”—in combination with other allegations of bias—
plausibly establish gender bias required of an erroneous outcome claim).
89. 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016).
90. 411 U.S. 792 (1972).
91. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 54 (“The ‘minimal evidence suggesting an inference that the em-
ployer acted with discriminatory motivation’ can be satisfied by as little as a showing that the position
sought by the plaintiff remained open after plaintiff’s rejection and that the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of plaintiff’s qualifications.” (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)).
92. Id. at 49–50.
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case to say whether a complaint that alleged “men are invariably found
guilty” satisfies this standard, but such an outcome seems likely in the Sec-
ond Circuit.93 On the other hand, the “invariably found guilty” allegation
would not be sufficient if the case itself presents an example of the univer-
sity not finding a male respondent responsible for sexual assault.94 Addi-
tionally, if the plaintiff is unable to support an allegation of a pattern of
anti-male decisions with evidence, the erroneous outcome claim is vulnera-
ble to dismissal later in the case.
In the Columbia case, the plaintiff’s allegations of gender bias attrib-
uted certain procedural errors to the investigator, the hearing panel, and the
dean, who were all allegedly motivated by anti-male bias stemming from an
effort to “refute criticisms circulating in the student body and in the public
press that Columbia was turning a blind eye to female students’ charges of
sexual assaults by male students.”95 The court agreed that the alleged proce-
dural errors—which included the failure of the investigator and the panel to
seek out potential exculpatory witnesses that the plaintiff suggested, failure
to comply with University procedures designed to protect accused students,
and rendering of conclusions contrary to the weight of the evidence—cre-
ated a plausible inference of bias, though not necessarily gender bias.96
However, the complaint contained additional allegations that the university
was motivated to scapegoat a male student in order to counter the public
criticism that the university faced prior to and during the disciplinary hear-
ing that it had not taken seriously complaints of female students alleging
sexual assault by male students. The court reasoned that these allegations
satisfied the pleading standard as they were both sufficiently specific to put
the defendant on notice of the basis for the plaintiff’s claim of gender bias,
and, if proven true, could serve as the minimum amount of evidence from
which a jury could infer bias.97 Similarly, another court rejected the idea
93. Specifically, he had alleged that Columbia was biased against men in the wake of negative
publicity over its mishandling of a female student’s earlier complaints of sexual assault and that proce-
dural errors that occurred during the disciplinary process and the absence of evidence to support the
finding against are demonstrative of bias.
94. Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 173 F. Supp. 3d 586 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (Nor is the case that males
are “invariably found guilty” by the university disciplinary process, as even in the case at hand, one of
the plaintiffs was found not responsible of one of the counts against him.).
95. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 56.
96. Id. at 57 (“The alleged fact that [the investigator], and the panel and the Dean, chose to accept
an unsupported accusatory version over Plaintiff’s, and declined even to explore the testimony of Plain-
tiff’s witnesses, if true, gives plausible support to the proposition that they were motivated by bias in
discharging their responsibilities to fairly investigate and adjudicate the dispute.”).
97. Id. at 57–58 (“The Complaint alleges that after Columbia was severely criticized by the student
body and the press for toleration of sexual assault of female students, the University was motivated in
this instance to accept the female’s accusation of sexual assault and reject the male’s claim of consent,
so as to show the student body and the public that the University is serious about protecting female
students from sexual assault by male students—especially varsity athletes. There is nothing implausible
19
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that gender bias could plausibly be inferred from the university’s ramped-
up efforts to prevent and address sexual assault, given that the announce-
ments for its awareness and prevention claims were presented in a “gender-
neutral tone, addressed to all students, and published to improve campus
safety for both men and women.”98
In contrast to the Second Circuit’s opinion, other lower courts (includ-
ing the lower court in the Columbia case)99 rejected the idea that evidence
of a university’s bias against those who are accused of sexual assault could
qualify as evidence of bias against men.100 As one court explained, the in-
stitution “is not responsible for the gender makeup of those who are ac-
cused by other students of sexual misconduct.”101 This court and others
have refused to permit the category of “respondent” to serve as a proxy for
“male” in light of the fact that universities do not limit membership in that
category to just one sex.
or unreasonable about the Complaint’s suggested inference that the panel adopted a biased stance in
favor of the accusing female and against the defending male varsity athlete in order to avoid further
fanning the criticisms that Columbia turned a blind eye to such assaults.”).
98. Salisbury Univ., 123 F. Supp. 3d at 766–76. Similarly, funding a sexual assault prevention
program with a grant from the Avon Fund for Women did not suggest gender bias because the program
was advertised “for all students.” In contrast, however, if a university’s sexual assault prevention pro-
gram is amenable to allegations that it promotes gender stereotypes about rape, a complaint that asserts
such allegations will survive a motion to dismiss, as evidenced by the ruling in Doe v. Washington and
Lee Univ., No. 6:14-CV-00052, 2015 WL 4647996 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2015). There, the plaintiff alleged
that gender bias could be attributed to the Title IX officer who presented the case against him, as
evidenced by her public endorsement of the idea, expressed by a guest speaker, that “sexual assault
occurs whenever a woman has consensual sex with a man and regrets it because she had internal reser-
vations that she did not outwardly express.” Because the plaintiff’s case “parallels of the situation it
describes and the circumstances under which Plaintiff was found responsible for sexual misconduct” and
because the Title IX officer wielded “considerable influence” in the proceedings, it is possible, the judge
reasoned, for a jury to find evidence of gender bias. Washington and Lee Univ., 2015 WL 4647996, at
*10.
99. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (concluding that any favoritism towards the complain-
ant “could equally have been—and more plausibly was—prompted by lawful, independent goals, such
as a desire (enhanced, perhaps, by the fear of negative publicity or Title IX liability to the victims of
sexual assault) to take allegations of rape on campus seriously and to treat complainants with a high
degree of sensitivity.”).
100. King v. DePauw Univ., 2:14-CV-70-WTL-DKL, 2014 WL 4197507, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22,
2014); Sahm v. Miami Univ., 110 F. Supp. 3d 774, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s allegation
that a campus safety officer encouraged a (presumably exculpatory) witness not to testify constituted an
allegation of bias, noting “[t]hese facts pleaded against [the officer] do not suggest a gender bias against
males so much as against students accused of sexual assault.”); Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 173 F. Supp.
3d 586 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the university’s sensitivity to the complainant’s
trauma indicated gender bias, given the possibility that the university has only ever received complaints
that name male students as perpetrators of sexual assault, and the possibility that women are more likely
than men to report sexual assault); Salau v. Denton, 139 F. Supp. 3d 989, 999 (W.D. Mo. 2015) (“Even
if the University treated the female student more favorably than the Plaintiff, during the disciplinary
process, ‘the mere fact that Plaintiff is male and [the alleged victim] is female does not suggest that the
disparate treatment was because of Plaintiff’s sex.’”).
101. King, 2014 WL 4197507, at *10.
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On the other hand, the Second Circuit’s decision is consistent with one
lower court ruling that accepted a plaintiff’s allegation of gender bias which
incorporated a version of a scapegoat narrative. In Wells v. Xavier Univer-
sity,102 a plaintiff alleged that errors in the process which led to his suspen-
sion were motivated by gender bias stemming from an ongoing investiga-
tion by the Department of Education into claims that the university re-
sponded inadequately to female students’ reports of sexual assault.
Specifically, he claimed that university officials denied him procedural
rights “in order to demonstrate to the OCR that Defendants would take ac-
tion, as they had failed to in the past, against males accused of sexual as-
sault.”103 The court agreed that if the plaintiff could prove this was true, it
would be a plausible basis for the jury to find that Xavier University vio-
lated Title IX.104 But rather than continue to litigate the case, the parties
agreed to a settlement of undisclosed terms.105
Thus, whether a plaintiff can survive a university’s motion to dismiss
by alleging the university’s rush to judgment against students accused of
sexual assault may depend on the jurisdiction in which the plaintiff files the
erroneous outcome claim. Jurisdictions bound or persuaded by the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in Columbia or the federal district court decision in
Wells will view allegations of bias against students accused of sexual as-
sault as capable of supporting an inference of gender bias, while other juris-
dictions may continue to refuse to conflate anti-respondent and anti-male
bias.106
Even if a plaintiff initially alleges the elements of an erroneous out-
come claim to the court’s satisfaction, it must eventually support those
claims with evidence. At this time, there are far fewer summary judgment
decisions evaluating plaintiffs’ evidentiary support for erroneous outcome
claims than opinions deciding motions to dismiss claims for insufficient
pleading. One such decision was Mallory v. Ohio University,107 in which
the plaintiff argued that a hearing panel erred when it considered the com-
plainant’s intoxication as evidence that sexual contact between them was
“unwanted” under the university’s definition of sexual assault. The plaintiff
alleged this error was the product of “antiquated notions” that men are al-
102. 7 F. Supp. 3d 746 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
103. Id. at 751.
104. Id.
105. Amanda Lee Meyers, Dez Wells, Xavier Settle Suit, CINCINNATI INQUIRER (Apr. 24, 2014),
available at https://perma.cc/QZ6Z-38R6.
106. See, e.g., Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, No. 6:15-CV-02257-MC, 2016 WL 4708540, at *9 (D. Or.
Sept. 8, 2016) (“I decline to extend the Second Circuit’s reasoning because Plaintiffs make no similar
allegations of an atmosphere of scrutiny and, even had they done so, there remains no plausible infer-
ence that a university’s aggressive response to allegations of sexual misconduct is evidence of gender
discrimination.”).
107. 76 F. App’x 634, 639 (6th Cir. 2003).
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ways the aggressors.108 The court did not determine whether the university
erred in applying its sexual assault policy, because even if it had, there was
no evidence of the bias the plaintiff alleged, such as an example of female
respondent benefitting from a different interpretation.109 Similarly, in a
more recent case against Vassar College, the court rejected the plaintiff’s
attempt to prove bias based on an inference that only anti-male bias could
explain why the hearing panel weighed the evidence in the way that it
did.110 As of this writing, there are no cases in which erroneous outcome
claims have been litigated past summary judgment.
B. Selective Enforcement
Unlike erroneous outcome claims, plaintiffs in selective enforcement
claims do not need to argue that they were disciplined in error, just that they
were singled out for punishment because of their sex. Essentially, if the
plaintiff is male, he must show either that the institution does not discipline
women or that it disciplines them less severely for the same conduct.111 For
example, a male plaintiff was allowed to pursue a Title IX claim based on
the allegation that his law school considered a female complainant’s
charges against him but disregarded his complaint of assault against another
student.112 Yet, institutions often prevail on motions to dismiss selective
enforcement cases because plaintiffs rarely have examples of a female com-
parator.113 Even in a case where the plaintiff did produce evidence of a
female student who had been accused of sexual assault but not suspended or
expelled, the university prevailed on a motion for summary judgment be-
cause of dissimilarities other than gender roles that warranted the different
outcomes.114
108. Id. at 639.
109. Id.
110. Yu, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (“Aside from broadly stating that ‘the [p]anel was wrong’ to discount
the Facebook messages, Yu points to no evidence suggesting that such discounting was due to gender
bias. Yu argues that gender bias is the only explanation for how the Interpersonal Violence Panel could
have believed Complainant’s version of events given the Facebook messages, but this ignores the cor-
roborating testimony of Student A and Student B as to Complainant’s incapacitation, as well as Com-
plainant’s own explanation for writing the Facebook messages.”).
111. This is like the requirement in a Title VII case for the plaintiff to show those outside the
protected class were treated more favorably.
112. Vaughn v. Vt. L. Sch., 2:10-CV-276, 2011 WL 3421521 (D. Vt. 2011), aff’d, 489 Fed. App’x
505 (2d Cir. 2012).
113. Prasad, 2016 WL 3212079, at *18 (“Having failed to allege factual support for the proposition
that female students who were accused of sexual misconduct at Cornell were treated more favorably
than male students under similar circumstance, Plaintiff’s Title IX selective enforcement claim is dis-
missed.”); Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *9 (same); Austin v. Univ. of Or., 2016 WL
4708540, at *7; Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., No. 2:15-CV-02478-SVW-JEM, 9 (C.D. Cal. July
25, 2016).
114. Mallory, 76 F. App’x at 640.
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In another case, a court refused to dismiss a plaintiff’s selective en-
forcement claim upon concluding that his allegation of “selective, gender-
based enforcement” met the minimum requirements for pleading a com-
plaint.115 Specifically, he complained that the university failed to investi-
gate a reported sexual assault that he claimed was committed against him
by a female student. The court agreed that if proven, this theory would
support a Title IX claim based on selective enforcement.116 As with errone-
ous outcome claims, however, no selective enforcement claims have yet
survived motions for summary judgment.
C. Disparate Impact
Disparate impact discrimination occurs when the application of non-
discriminatory practices negatively affects one group, such as men, more
often than its counterpart, such as women. Given that men are over-
represented among students accused of sexual assault, procedures that im-
pair the rights of respondents arguably have a disparate impact on men. Yet,
it seems reasonably clear after Alexander v. Sandoval117 that disparate im-
pact claims are outside the scope of a plaintiff’s right of action under Title
IX.
In Sandoval, the Supreme Court considered plaintiffs’ argument that a
state’s English-only driver’s license test had a disparate impact on immi-
grants and thus violated Title VI, a federal law that prohibits federally
funded programs from discrimination based on race, color, and national ori-
gin.118 The plaintiffs cited the Department of Justice’s regulations imple-
menting Title VI, which prohibit disparate impact discrimination and had
been upheld by an earlier Court as a valid agency interpretation of the stat-
ute.119 The Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that disparate impact
claims are outside the scope of Title VI’s implied right of action.120 As a
result, while the Department of Justice is free to bring enforcement actions
based on its disparate regulations, private plaintiffs have no such enforce-
ment power.
Title IX was modeled on Title VI and, like its counterpart, contains an
implied right of action that permits private enforcement. Thus, many lower
courts have concluded that Sandoval, by extension, forecloses a private
115. Marshall v. Ind. Univ., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1210 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
116. Id.
117. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
118. Id. at 279.
119. Id. at 281 (citing Guardians Assoc. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
120. Id. at 285.
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right of action for disparate claims under Title IX as well.121 In one case,
however, without addressing the impact of Sandoval, a federal district court
considered the plaintiff’s evidence in support of his disparate impact claim,
which it determined was insufficient to create a triable fact for the jury.
Specifically, the court refused to acknowledge the plaintiff’s claim that the
college’s procedures produced a pattern of negative outcomes for men when
the college had found male respondents “not responsible” in two of the
previous six disciplinary matters, and in another, had refrained from expel-
ling a respondent who was found responsible.122
Thus, the most likely outcome for a plaintiff’s disparate impact claim
is dismissal at the pleading stage. As the example above shows, even a
plaintiff who convinced a court to recognize his disparate impact claim
would still face the daunting burden of proving that such a pattern existed.
The mere fact that only men had been accused of sexual assault was not
enough in light of the diverse outcomes in their cases.
D. Deliberate Indifference
In rare cases, courts consider the possibility that an institution is liable
under Title IX for failing to address the plaintiff’s alleged procedural errors
on the grounds that such failure amounted to deliberate indifference. For
example, in Wells v. Xavier University, a court determined that the plaintiff
had sufficiently pled a deliberate indifference claim by alleging university
officials had actual notice of the allegedly defective hearing that it failed to
remedy.123 Conversely, other courts have rejected deliberate indifference
claims that do not include an allegation of sexual harassment or other unof-
ficial conduct.124
Courts that consider deliberate indifference claims in the context of
disciplined-student cases mistakenly incorporate a framework developed to
address misconduct—namely sexual harassment—that does not “involve
official policy of the recipient entity.”125 The Ninth Circuit recognized the
121. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Tr’s, 2015 WL 3453753, at *3; Tsuruta v. Augustana Univ., 4:15-CV-
04150-KES, 2015 WL 5838602, at *3 (D.S.D. Oct. 7, 2015); Ludlow v. N.W. Univ., 79 F. Supp. 3d
824, 832–33 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
122. Bleiler v. Coll. of Holy Cross, CIV.A. 11-11541-DJC, 2013 WL 4714340, at *8 (D. Mass. Aug.
26, 2013).
123. 7 F. Supp. 3d 746, 751–52 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
124. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d at 190–91; see also Univ. of the S., 687 F. Supp. at 757–58 (“The
facts pled by Plaintiffs, however, do not contain the critical component of any Title IX claim necessary
to make a finding under the deliberate indifference standard, namely that the University’s alleged ac-
tions constituted sexual harassment.”).
125. See Part II.A.2 (deliberate indifference standard in sexual harassment cases); see also Gebser,
524 U.S. at 290–93; Ohio Univ., 2015 WL 1179955, at *8 (“It is unclear as to how exactly this [deliber-
ate indifference] claim applies to the facts of this case, as usually, this claim is asserted by a victim
against a school or university official who failed to protect him or her from harassment or otherwise
24
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limits of the deliberate indifference framework when it corrected a lower
court’s erroneous application of that standard to a case challenging inequi-
table distribution of a university’s athletic opportunities. Unlike acts of sex-
ual harassment committed by students or employees, “Universities’ deci-
sions with respect to athletics are ‘easily attributable to the funding recipi-
ent and . . . always—by definition—intentional.’”126 The conduct and
outcome of a disciplinary hearing reflects intentional, institutional conduct
in the same way that a decision to allocate athletic resources is an inten-
tional decision attributable to the institution. In disciplined-student cases,
the existing frameworks for erroneous outcome and selective enforcement
are sufficient frameworks for analyzing the possibility of intentional bias. It
is unnecessary to stretch the deliberate indifference framework, developed
for distinguishable situations of sexual harassment, onto disciplinary cases
as well.
In conclusion, disciplined students are frequently incorporating various
Title IX claims into their lawsuits challenging their expulsion or suspension
for sexual assault. Even as erroneous outcome claims have found a foothold
in some jurisdictions, neither these claims nor other Title IX claims have
exposed educational institutions to liability other than one settlement of an
undisclosed amount. In contrast, other sources of law, discussed in the next
Part, are more useful safeguards for the procedural rights of disciplined stu-
dents.
IV. OTHER SOURCES OF LAW IN DISCIPLINED-STUDENT CASES
As Part III illustrates, Title IX has played a minimal role in ensuring
that students accused of sexual assault are treated fairly, as Title IX’s nar-
row role is to ensure that the disciplinary process and its outcomes do not
impose disparate treatment on male and female students. The statute is ag-
nostic on the question of whether the university treated an accused student
fairly based on his status as a respondent, as opposed to his gender. Other
sources of law besides Title IX are far more effective at securing substan-
tive rights of students accused of misconduct, including the Constitution’s
Due Process Clause, administrative law, and contract law.
A. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states, including state universi-
ties, from infringing on an individual’s right to liberty or property without
address the alleged misconduct—actions that [Ohio University] officials undisputedly took to protect the
alleged victim from [the accused student].”).
126. Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 968 (9th Cir. 2010).
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adhering to the minimum procedural protections.127 The Supreme Court’s
leading case on the application of due process to student discipline is Goss
v. Lopez.128 There, the Court held that due process requires educational in-
stitutions to hold some kind of hearing before subjecting high school stu-
dents to lengthy suspensions on charges of misconduct.129 As demonstrated
in Lopez, a procedural due process analysis has two parts: first, that the state
has impaired a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or property;
and second, that additional procedural protections were warranted by the
weighing of the benefit of additional procedures to the plaintiff against the
cost of providing them. On the first question, the Court determined that
high school students have a property interest at stake because state law cre-
ated an entitlement to public education.130 It also recognized that students
have a protected liberty interest in continuing their education and profes-
sional lives free from the reputational harm that comes from an unwarranted
disciplinary decision.131 Many courts have recognized that like the high
school students in Lopez, college students also have a property interest in
their state-school educations.132 While there are no state laws that create an
entitlement to higher education, a property interest in higher education is
rooted in the contract (express or implied) between a university, which
agrees to allow the student to complete their education, and the student,
who agrees to meet academic standards and adhere to the code of con-
duct.133 As for liberty interests, college students face at least as great a risk
as high school students do of reputational harm resulting from discipline
interfering with continued education and professional pursuits.134
But the fact that procedural due process applies does not resolve the
question of how much process is due. In Lopez, the Court ruled that, at a
127. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
128. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 573–74.
131. Id. at 574–75.
132. See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that “a
student facing expulsion or suspension from a public educational institution is entitled to the protections
of due process”); Doe v. Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d 646, 658 (W.D. Va. 2016) (finding universities policies
create entitlement in continued enrollment that is a constitutionally protected property interest); Brown
v. Univ. of Kan., 16 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1288 (D. Kan. 2014) aff’d, 599 F. App’x 833 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“Plaintiff contends that he possessed a property interest in his continued education at the School of
Law. Plaintiff paid his tuition and ultimately went through two semesters of law school. Accordingly,
the Court concludes that he had a property interest in his continued enrollment which entitled him to
procedural due process.”); Zwick v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., No. CIV. 06-12639, 2008 WL 1902031,
at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (finding “the arguments in favor of a property interest to be persua-
sive” in Michigan).
133. E.g., Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2012); Manolov v. Borough of
Manhattan Cmty. Coll., 952 F. Supp. 2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
134. E.g., Doe v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., No. 1:15-CV-209, 2016 WL 775776
(E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
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minimum, due process requires that schools provide students “notice of the
charges against [them]” and an “opportunity to tell [their] side of the
story.”135 Because the suspension that the students in Lopez were facing
was short (under ten days), the Court read these requirements as satisfied by
an “informal give and take.”136 But the Court also recognized that “more
formal procedures” would be warranted in situations involving longer or
more permanent forms of discipline.137  College students challenging disci-
pline for sexual assault have typically been suspended for a quarter, a se-
mester, or longer, or in some cases, expelled.138 Therefore, the Court’s anal-
ysis in Lopez does not offer much guidance on the question of what process
is due, other than to identify the concepts of notice and the opportunity to
be heard.
Lower courts agree that colleges and universities need not provide ac-
cused students the same procedural rights that criminal defendants receive,
though they do not always agree on the particular rights a student must
receive. For example, courts disagree about whether due process entitles
students the right to know the identity of the accuser, to cross-examine the
accusers and other witnesses,139 and to counsel,140 though courts are more
likely to require such procedural protections when the student is facing ex-
pulsion or long suspensions. Notably, no court has ever held that more than
a preponderance of evidence of a student’s misconduct is constitutionally
135. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 581.
136. Id. at 584.
137. Id.
138. E.g., Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 712 (E.D. Va. 2015)
(challenging expulsion); Alger, 175 F. Supp. 3d at 658 (challenging five-and-one-half year suspension);
Sterrett, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 927, vacated (Sept. 30, 2015), appeal dismissed (Oct. 1, 2015) (challenging
three-year suspension).
139. Compare Dillon v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 594 F.2d 699, 700 (8th Cir. 1979) (high
school student expelled for an indefinite period was “denied procedural due process of law by the refusal
of school officials to allow him to call the accusing teacher as a witness during his expulsion hearing in
order to help resolve disputed issues of fact”), and McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902, 911 (10th Cir.
1977) (right to cross-examine “those whose word deprives a person of his livelihood . . . [and when that
decision is] based partly on undisclosed reports, which might stain a reputation and threaten a liveli-
hood”), with Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (college student not permitted to cross-
examine or have a right to counsel in determining length of suspension after engaging in fight), and
Gorman, 837 F.2d at 16 (student disciplined by university “had the opportunity to cross-examine his
accusers as to the incidents and events in question, and there is no evidence that any [such] limitation on
. . . [the student’s right to cross-examine his accusers on his allegations of bias] prevented him from
eliciting the truth about the facts and events in issue [and thus] [u]nder the circumstances presented,”
was not deprived of procedural due process).
140. Compare Osteen, 13 F.3d at 225 (college student not permitted right to counsel in determining
length of suspension after engaging in fight), with Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.1978)
(due process requires universities to permit respondents to be represented by counsel when they are
facing simultaneous criminal charges), and Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23 (Me.
2005) (restricting the active participation of counsel did not violate due process).
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required to suspend or expel that student from school.141 In fact, some
courts have endorsed an even lower standard of proof: substantial evi-
dence.142 As a result, a university’s constitutional obligation to provide due
process to disciplined students does not conflict with any specific require-
ments it faces under Title IX to conduct a “prompt and equitable response”
to reported sexual assault.
Plaintiffs who have challenged disciplinary outcomes for sexual as-
sault in recent years have seen mixed results in efforts to litigate due pro-
cess claims. Here are some examples.
Example 1: George Mason University. A disciplined student’s recent
case against George Mason University provides a particularly compelling
example of a due process claim because the uncontroverted facts permitted
the plaintiff to win on summary judgment.143 In this case, the plaintiff dis-
covered evidence that conduct he was punished for was outside the scope of
the notice of the charges against him, violating a basic tenet of due process.
Additionally, the evidence supported a second due process violation during
the appeal process when the assistant dean who heard the disciplined stu-
dent’s appeal held separate, closed meetings with the individual members of
the disciplinary panel, the complainant, and the respondent without inform-
ing the respondent about the content of those meetings and not providing
him an opportunity to respond. Lastly, evidence in the record demonstrated
that the assistant dean had “made up his mind so definitively that nothing
[the] plaintiff might have said [in the appeal process] could have altered his
decision”—a rare example of decision maker bias severe enough to warrant
a due process violation on its own.144 The court later ordered the plaintiff
reinstated with a clean record and enjoined the university from retrying him
for the same alleged misconduct for which he was initially expelled (though
it did permit the university to conduct a disciplinary process on other
grounds that were not previously adjudicated).145
The university’s procedural errors in this case in no way resulted from
requirements of Title IX. George Mason University could have engaged in
the required “prompt and equitable response” to the charges against the
plaintiff while still providing thorough notice of the charges, permitting
both parties the opportunity to respond to the testimony presented in the
other’s closed-door meeting, and removing the biased decision maker. None
141. See Baker, supra note 45. R
142. Lavinia M. Weizel, The Process That Is Due: Preponderance of the Evidence As the Standard
of Proof for University Adjudications of Student-on-Student Sexual Assault Complaints, 53 B.C. L. REV.
1613, 1634 (2012).
143. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602 (E.D. Va. 2016).
144. George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 620.
145. Id. at 625.
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 78 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-1\MON105.txt unknown Seq: 29 29-MAR-17 14:15
2017 TITLE IX AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 99
of these efforts to protect the plaintiff’s right to due process would have run
afoul of any requirements in the Dear Colleague Letter.
Example 2: University of Michigan. Because due process claims do
not require plaintiffs to allege and ultimately prove gender bias, such claims
often survive motions to dismiss where Title IX claims fail. In one recent
example, a plaintiff was permitted to litigate some of his due process claims
after his Title IX claim against the University of Michigan was dis-
missed.146 There, the court agreed with the university that the disciplinary
hearing itself did not impair the plaintiff’s right to due process, even though
it did not provide him with an opportunity to cross-examine his accuser, the
complainant. Yet the court was concerned with the allegation that the inves-
tigator interviewed the now-plaintiff for a report without providing him no-
tice of the charges against him and did not allow him a meaningful opportu-
nity to participate in the report’s creation. The court permitted his due pro-
cess claim to go forward on these grounds.147
In this case, the University of Michigan, like many universities, elected
to adopt a so-called “investigator model” of sexual assault response, in
which a trained investigator rather than a hearing panel is responsible for
gathering and presenting evidence to the decision maker. Even though the
court in this case found aspects of the university’s approach under this
model to potentially violate due process, the court’s decision was hardly an
indictment of the investigator model overall. The court simply confirmed
that universities must deploy this model in a manner that respects respon-
dents’ due process rights. Additionally, it illustrates how an investigator
must inform the respondent of the charges prior to the initial interview and
must give the respondent some opportunity for input on the report’s find-
ings prior to finalizing the report. Notably, the court took no issue with the
other aspects of the investigator model, such as the absence of the respon-
dent’s opportunity to confront witnesses and the complainant directly. With
minor adjustment, the university could have engaged in its preferred
method of sexual assault response and ensured that the respondent received
the process that was due.
Example 3: Appalachian State University. Like the University of
Michigan case, the case against Appalachian State also serves as an exam-
ple of a plaintiff surviving a motion to dismiss his alleged due process vio-
lations while having his reverse discrimination Title IX claims dismissed. In
this case, the court allowed a plaintiff to proceed in litigating a due process
challenge to having been suspended for twenty days for sexual assault
146. Sterrett v. Cowan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 916 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2015).
147. Id. at 931.
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before a hearing panel ultimately exonerated him on appeal.148 Specifically,
the court held that the university violated the plaintiff’s right to due process
by holding a second hearing on charges of sexual misconduct after the first
hearing panel found him not responsible. The university did not invoke ap-
propriate reasons for holding a second hearing, such as a finding that the
first panel’s decision contravened the clear weight of the evidence or egre-
gious procedural error. Without such standards, the court was concerned
that the university “could simply order a new misconduct trial whenever the
university did not prevail—which is exactly what is alleged here.”149 The
court’s opinion denying the university’s motion to dismiss on this aspect of
the plaintiff’s due process claim expressly laid to rest any concern that its
ruling created a conflict with Title IX when it rejected the university’s argu-
ment that it was compelled to conduct the second hearing by the Dear Col-
league Letter.150 While the Dear Colleague Letter does require that the right
to appeal must be equally available to both parties,151 an appeal is distin-
guishable from a second hearing. A due process-compliant standard for re-
hearing—one that is limited to situations where the findings contravene the
clear weight of the evidence or involve egregious procedural error—would
comply with Title IX as long as that opportunity for rehearing was available
to respondents and complainants on equal terms.
In this same case, the court found the plaintiff’s allegation that the
university notified him of a second charge of sexual harassment less than
twenty-four hours before the hearing also properly alleged a violation of
due process. On this issue as well, the court’s ruling creates no conflict with
Title IX. Even under the requirement to engage in a “prompt and equitable
response,” the university remained free to provide the plaintiff with earlier
notice of the sexual harassment charge or to delay the hearing in order to
provide him with adequate time to prepare his defense.152 Notably, the
court dismissed several aspects of his due process claim, including: his rep-
resentation by a graduate student while the complainant had a lawyer; the
university’s failure to tell him about potential witnesses that could have
helped his case; the exclusion of a potential witness who would have testi-
fied about the complainant’s sexual history; the hearing panel’s inclusion of
a member who had found against his co-respondent in a prior matter; and
148. Tanyi v. Appalachian St. Univ., 5:14-CV-170RLV, 2015 WL 4478853, at *6–7 (W.D.N.C. July
22, 2015).
149. Id. at *6.
150. Id. at *7.
151. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 7, at 12 (“OCR also recommends that schools provide an R
appeals process. If a school provides for appeal of the findings or remedy, it must do so for both
parties.”).
152. Tanyi, 2015 WL 4478853, at *5–7.
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the fact that no one informed him of his right to have a separate hearing
from that of his co-respondent.
As these examples show, courts are open to disciplined-student plain-
tiffs’ procedural due process claims. On these claims, plaintiffs can survive
motions to dismiss, and even win outright, without the unnecessary step of
linking procedural error to gender bias. Moreover, because universities’ due
process obligations do not conflict with those under Title IX, litigation on
due process grounds can hold universities accountable for procedural fair-
ness without weakening the university’s sexual assault response or exposing
the university to a risk of liability under Title IX.
B. “Basic Fairness” (Due Process for Private Schools)
Though the Constitution’s Due Process Clause does not bind private
colleges, courts have in many cases insisted that private universities have an
obligation not to treat students unfairly or with malice.153 Such requirement
is sometimes rooted in the contract doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.
By way of recent example, a federal court in Massachusetts relied on what
it called the “basic fairness” doctrine to permit a plaintiff to litigate his
claim alleging that Brandeis University failed to provide sufficient notice of
the charges against him, which arose out of conduct over the course of a
long-term relationship between the plaintiff and his ex-boyfriend.154 The
court reasoned that, given the span of time in question, the university’s
failure to provide notice made it particularly difficult for the plaintiff to
surmise and thus defend against the precise misconduct that was under scru-
tiny. Additionally, Brandeis University allegedly denied the plaintiff the
right to counsel, denied him any opportunity to cross-examine the com-
plainant, prohibited his access to the investigator’s report as well as the
statements of witnesses and other evidence against him, and permitted the
same official who investigated the complaint against the plaintiff to also
adjudicate it in the first instance, while also limiting the plaintiff’s right to
appeal.155
Importantly, none of these alleged violations conflict with the univer-
sity’s obligations under Title IX and the Dear Colleague Letter to respond
promptly and equitably to reported sexual assault. In fact, the Dear Col-
league Letter’s requirement for symmetrical procedures implicitly endorses
the respondent’s right to receive a copy of the investigator’s report and to
153. Bleiler v. Coll. of Holy Cross, CIV.A. 11-11541-DJC, 2013 WL 4714340, at *5 (D. Mass. Aug.
26, 2013) (“‘A private university, college, or school may not arbitrarily or capriciously dismiss a stu-
dent.’”) (citing Coveney v. Coll. of Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136 (Mass. 1983)).
154. Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. CV 15-11557-FDS, 2016 WL 1274533, at *33–34 (D. Mass. Mar.
31, 2016).
155. Id. at *34–37.
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have access to appeal, as long as those rights are provided to the complain-
ant as well.156 Furthermore, nothing in the Dear Colleague Letter prohibits
the separation of function between the investigators and adjudicators. And
while the court also described the university’s use of the preponderance of
evidence standard, which is a requirement of Title IX according to the Dear
Colleague Letter, as “particularly troublesome in light of the elimination of
other basic rights of the accused,” this expression of concern does not iso-
late the preponderance standard as independent grounds for concluding that
Brandeis University’s process may lack basic fairness.157
In Brandeis University, the court also concluded that “basic fairness”
extends to the substance of the decision as well as the procedure by which
the decision was reached, and on this ground, the court permitted the plain-
tiff to litigate his claims that the university’s decision against him employed
an unfair definition of consent when the investigator failed to take into ac-
count that some of the sexual conduct that the plaintiff was punished for
occurred in the context of a long-term relationship, which often incorpo-
rates implied consent.158 Nothing in Title IX precludes universities like
Brandeis from considering a respondent’s argument about implied consent.
All the OCR has said on this matter is that the respondent should not auto-
matically win on this ground.159
C. Administrative Law
Some plaintiffs in recent cases have successfully argued that the proce-
dural and substantive unfairness of disciplinary decisions rendered by state
universities violates their state’s administrative procedure act. In one well-
known case, a state court in Tennessee invalidated the University of Ten-
nessee at Chattanooga’s expulsion of a male student and wrestler for sexual
assault after concluding that the university improperly shifted the burden of
proof by effectively requiring the respondent to prove that he had obtained
156. As one commentator points out, some aspects of the Dear Colleague Letter’s requirement of
symmetrical procedure operates to increase respondents’ procedural rights in many cases, such as one in
which a state supreme court upheld the suspension of a student who was denied certain procedural rights
that were granted to the complainant. Amy Chmielewski, Defending the Preponderance of the Evidence
Standard in College Adjudications of Sexual Assault, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 143, 165 (2013).
157. See William E. Thro, No Clash of Constitutional Values: Respecting Freedom and Equality in
Public University Sexual Assault Cases, 28 REGENT U. L. REV. 197, 209 (2016) (arguing that the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard is constitutionally permissible in combination with other procedural
safeguards).
158. Brandeis Univ., 2016 WL 1274533, at *19–20, 39–40. Specifically, the court criticized the
investigator for automatically concluding that the plaintiff had not obtained consent to kiss the com-
plainant in his sleep, on the grounds that sleep is incapacitation.
159. Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, supra note 50, at 38 (“Further, a R
school should recognize that the mere fact of a current or previous consensual dating or sexual relation-
ship between the two parties does not itself imply consent or preclude a finding of sexual violence.”).
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the complainant’s consent.160 Notably, this conduct would be improper
under Title IX as well. Even though universities are required to prohibit
sexual contact that occurs without consent,161 the Dear Colleague Letter
makes clear that the preponderance standard applies to the university’s bur-
den of proof, which includes the burden of proving that consent was not or
could not have been granted.162
In another case, a California superior court set aside the University of
California at San Diego’s decision to suspend a student for sexual assault
after finding that the university failed to use fair procedures and evidence-
based decision making, as required of state agencies (including state univer-
sities) as a matter of administrative law.163 One of the procedural errors in
this case occurred when the chair of the disciplinary hearing board limited
the respondent’s right to cross-examine the female student who had accused
him of sexual assault by only asking nine of the thirty-one questions he
submitted. The court took no issue with the university’s practice of routing
cross-examination through an intermediary and the weeding out of irrele-
vant and redundant questions that only serve to traumatize potential victims
of sexual assault. However, the university in this case redacted a whole
series of questions about ostensibly exculpatory text messages exchanged
by the parties after the alleged assault.164 In so doing, the university denied
the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to present a material aspect of his
defense. Notably, no university is required by Title IX to limit a respon-
dent’s right to conduct a meaningful cross-examination. As explained
above, OCR is agnostic on the question of whether to permit cross-exami-
nation of witnesses and parties, insisting only that the rights of both parties
be the same in that regard.
As these two examples show, state administrative law provides mean-
ingful opportunities for plaintiffs to challenge unfairness in university disci-
plinary proceedings. These legal protections are consistent with universi-
ties’ obligations under Title IX to conduct a “prompt and equitable” re-
sponse to reported sexual assault.
160. Mock ‘wins’ his appeal against UT-Chattanooga, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 14, 2015, 5:49
PM), https://perma.cc/3HZX-D2CE, (last accessed Nov. 11, 2016).
161. 34 C.F.R. § 668.46(k). This requirement is part of the Clery Act. It is cited in the Dear Col-
league Letter, supra note 7, at 11. R
162. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 7, at 1; see also Brett Sokolow & Daniel Carter, Corey Mock R
v. The University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HIGHER EDUCATION RISK
MANAGEMENT, https://perma.cc/AHP7-LTVG (last accessed Jan. 1, 2017).
163. Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. at San Diego, No. 37-2015-00010549-CU-WM-CTL (San
Diego Cnty. Super. Ct. July 10, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/LK9Q-JT97.
164. Id.
33
Buzuvis: Title IX and Procedural Fairness
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2017
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\78-1\MON105.txt unknown Seq: 34 29-MAR-17 14:15
104 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 78
D. Breach of Contract
Students disciplined for sexual assault have successfully litigated
breach of contract claims to challenge procedural errors in a private univer-
sity’s grievance process.165 As one district court explained:
When a student is admitted to a university, an implied contract arises between
the parties which states that if the student complies with the terms prescribed
by the university, he will obtain the degree he seeks. The rights and obliga-
tions of the parties as contained in the university’s bulletins, circulars and
regulations made available to the student, become a part of this contract.166
Public universities often succeed in dismissing breach of contract claims
and other state-law claims on sovereign immunity grounds.167 But in cases
against private universities, students disciplined for sexual assault have pre-
vailed on breach of contract claims because sovereign immunity does not
apply. In fact, the results of one empirical study suggest that breach of con-
tract claims against private institutions have a comparable rate of success to
due process claims against public institutions, dispelling the misperception
that private university students are categorically disadvantaged when seek-
ing recourse of procedural errors.168
In one early case, a district court granted summary judgment to a
plaintiff who was disciplined for a violation (“disrespect of persons”) for
which he did not receive notice.169 This constituted a violation of the uni-
versity’s contractual obligation to “state the nature of the charges with suffi-
cient particularity to permit the accused party to prepare to meet the
charges,” per the university’s student handbook.170 More recently, a federal
court concluded after a bench trial that Brown University violated its con-
tract with a student suspended for sexual assault by employing a definition
of consent that was not in its policies at the time of the alleged miscon-
duct.171 The new definition clarified that that consent could not be obtained
through “manipulation,” and the charge in Doe’s case was that he had
manipulated another student to have sex.172 As an aside, he had admitted to
165. See K.B. Melear, The Contractual Relationship Between Student and Institution: Disciplinary,
Academic, and Consumer Contexts, 30 J.C. & U.L. 175, 182–88 (2003) (discussing early cases).
166. Nungesser v. Columbia Univ., 169 F. Supp. 3d 353, 369–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Vought v.
Teachers College, Columbia U., 511 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1987)).
167. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *5; Sahm v. Miami Univ. 1:14-CV-698, 2015
WL 93631, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2015).
168. Perry A. Zirkel, Procedural and Substantive Student Challenges to Disciplinary Sanctions at
Private—As Compared with Public—Institutions of Higher Education: A Glaring Gap?, 83 MISS. L.J.
863, 893 (2014).
169. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 243–47 (D. Vt. 1994).
170. Id. at 246–47.
171. Doe v. Brown Univ., No. CV 16-017 S, 2016 WL 5409241 (D.R.I. Sept. 28, 2016) (finding of
fact and conclusion of law).
172. Id. at *18.
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such “manipulation” in an incriminating text message.173 The court deter-
mined that prior to the amended policy, a reasonable student would not
have expected that sexual activity to which another had been manipulated to
consent to violated the university’s policy, since the new policy “on its face
. . . make[s] any use of manipulation a violation, everything from a bribe to
the old school use of presents and flattery.”174 Therefore, the application of
the new definition breached the contract that existed between the university
and the student at the time.175
In this case, the university’s desire to retroactively apply its new defi-
nition of consent could be seen as a reasonable calculation to ensure that it
was satisfying its responsibility to the complainant to protect her civil rights
under Title IX. However, the plaintiff’s contractual rights and the complain-
ant’s civil rights were not necessarily in conflict in this case for several
reasons. First, as the court itself acknowledges, a panel could possibly have
found the plaintiff responsible even while applying the university’s earlier,
informal definition of consent.176 The earlier definition incorporated “pre-
vailing community standards” rather than an express definition of con-
sent.177 The panel could have found a lack of consent under the earlier
definition since community standards presumably prohibit some, but possi-
bly not all, conduct that might otherwise be labeled “manipulative.” Sec-
ond, while the Department of Education does insist that educational institu-
tions employ a definition of consent that includes certain key concepts (for
example, providing that consent cannot be obtained from a person who is
incapacitated as a result of alcohol or drugs178 and clarifying that consent
cannot be inferred from prior sexual acts179), it does not require universities
to adopt a specific definition of consent or to define it as broadly as Brown
University has chosen to do. Third, while OCR has found universities in
violation of Title IX for not using policies and procedures that comply with
the Dear Colleague Letter, the agency’s broad enforcement power, com-
pared to judicial enforcement, is rooted in the premise that it is prospective
in nature.180 Thus, even in the most compelling of such cases in which
173. Id.
174. Id. at *19.
175. Id. at *20.
176. Id.
177. Doe v. Brown Univ., No. CV 16-017 S, 2016 WL 5409241 (D.R.I. Sept. 28, 2016).
178. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 7, at 1. R
179. Resolution Agreement between Tufts University and the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil
Rights (OCR), No. 01-10-2089, (Apr. 17, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/33EA-D9YE.
180. See supra Part II.B. Consistent with its prospective focus, in enforcement actions where the
Department of Education has found universities to violate Title IX in their failure to adequately secure
the civil rights of sexual assault complainants, the agency has not insisted that universities re-apply Title
IX-compliant procedures to earlier-decided cases. The fact that it refrains from imposing such a require-
ment—even as it requires the institution to correct erroneous withholding of academic accommodations,
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conduct occurred prior to the university’s adoption of a Title IX-compliant
policy and procedures, a university does not risk loss of federal funding by
applying an existing policy where a contract so requires. It only risks such
loss when it fails to change its policy and apply the changes going forward.
V. HARMONIZING TITLE IX AND RIGHTS OF STUDENTS
ACCUSED OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
As the preceding Parts illustrate, the handful of cases in which plain-
tiffs have succeeded on the merits—the cases against George Mason Uni-
versity, University of California at San Diego, University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga, and Brown University—have done so on grounds unrelated to
reverse discrimination. One of two elements of the erroneous outcome Title
IX claim is a material procedural error, which itself can be the basis for a
due process, administrative law, or breach of contract claim. Therefore,
plaintiffs should be more likely to succeed181 on the “lesser included” claim
than in the reverse discrimination claim that involves an extra, and more
challenging, step of pleading and proving gender bias.
Not only do plaintiffs not benefit from including reverse discrimina-
tion claims, they may be harming themselves as well. In one case, a plain-
tiff’s attorney’s focus on a Title IX claim apparently distracted the attorney
from pleading that the procedural errors alleged as part of the erroneous
outcome claim also constituted violations of due process.182 Additionally,
federal courts routinely refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims once federal Title IX claims have been dismissed.183 The
process of refiling these claims in state court adds to the overall time and
cost of litigating these claims that could be avoided if they had been the
plaintiff’s priority in the first place. Finally, the decision plaintiffs often
make to lead with Title IX claims draws the courts’ and the litigants’ focus
counseling, and other elements of a non-disciplinary response—demonstrates the agency’s concern for
procedural fairness to the respondent; e.g., Resolution Agreement between Tufts University and the U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights (OCR), No. 01-10-2089, (Apr. 17, 2014), available at https://per
ma.cc/33EA-D9YE; Resolution Agreement between Princeton University and the U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
New York Office for Civil Rights (OCR), No. 02-112025, (Oct. 12, 2014), available at https://perma.cc/
DP2H-KJZP.
181. Or at least successfully plead, as plaintiffs did in the cases against Brandeis, Appalachian State,
and the University of Michigan.
182. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, 2015 WL 4306521, at *1 n.1 (preventing the plaintiff from advancing
due process arguments “advanced for the first time in an opposition to a defendant’s motion to dis-
miss”).
183. See Mallory, 76 F. App’x at 641 (“The usual course is for the district court to dismiss state law
claims without prejudice if all federal claims are disposed of on summary judgment.”); Ludlow v. N.W.
Univ., 125 F. Supp. 3d 783, 793–94 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over state law
claims once Title IX claims had been dismissed); see also Blank v. Knox Coll., 14-CV-1386, 2015 WL
328602 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2015) (same).
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to what is often the weakest argument in the case and away from stronger
arguments rooted in procedural fairness.
Thus, the seemingly routine inclusion—and in many cases,
foregrounding—of a Title IX claim is not only unhelpful, but potentially
harmful to disciplined students. Robust litigation on matters of procedural
fairness, unencumbered by the distraction of a reverse discrimination narra-
tive, is essential to ensuring that university grievance processes are, and are
perceived as, valid and trustworthy. This is not only important to students
facing discipline, but also to those students whose civil rights universities
are striving to protect. Victims of sexual assault have an important stake in
procedural fairness because its absence exposes the disciplinary outcome to
internal and judicial appeals, which delay the process and risk overturning a
potentially valid disciplinary outcome that was reached by a flawed process.
Moreover, individual cases in which disciplinary outcomes are overturned
because of procedural errors contribute to the misperception that discipli-
nary processes in general are biased and promulgates negative stereotypes
about the veracity of complainants.
Additionally, disciplined-student plaintiffs’ emphasis on Title IX
claims contributes, perhaps by design, to anti-feminist backlash. Because
Title IX’s application to sexual assault is destabilizing to those who partici-
pate in and benefit from the cultural association of masculinity with power
that stems from rape, it may be the case that some disciplined-student plain-
tiffs find particular satisfaction in attacking the university with the same
weapon that resulted in their expulsion in the first place. They may seek to
impeach Title IX in the political arena by arguing that the statute is inher-
ently contradictory and biased in favor of one sex. Such an approach, if
intentional, is consistent with examples in the past of reverse discrimination
litigation backlash to efforts to address gendered violence.184 Other disci-
plined-student plaintiffs, however, may lack such a political agenda and
prefer to simply win their case with the arguments that most directly apply
to procedural fairness. Such plaintiffs may be harmed when their cases are
weaponized against Title IX, rather than being mere zealous litigation on
claims better fit for the issues at play. In any event, it is important for the
184. For example, in 2000, men’s rights activists sued state agencies in Minnesota that administered
state and federal money allocated for domestic violence shelters and other services for battered women,
claiming that such efforts constituted sex discrimination against men in violation of the Constitution’s
Equal Protection clause. These plaintiffs supported their claims with discredited allegations that men and
women are similarly situated with respect to their potential to become victims of domestic violence.
Similarly, the reverse discrimination explanation for why men are disciplined for sexual assault at dis-
proportionately higher rates seeks to obscure the fact that men commit sexual assault at disproportion-
ately higher rates. See Molly Dragiewicz, Equality with a Vengeance: Men’s Rights Groups, Battered
Women, and Antifeminist Backlash, 42.3 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY: A JOURNAL OF REVIEWS 384–85
(2011) (describing the litigation in Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2002)), https://perma.cc/
AN4U-VTAJ.
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public to recognize that reverse discrimination claims do little more than
contribute to a distracting myth of Title IX’s inherent contradictions. So
contextualized, reverse discrimination claims lose their power to undermine
the statute and its potential to motivate civil rights protection without
abridging the procedural rights of the accused.
Reverse discrimination claims aside, disciplined-student plaintiffs
should continue to challenge violations of their procedural rights as such.
Regardless of whether the problem of procedural unfairness to students ac-
cused of sexual misconduct is widespread or isolated, it is essential that
students have available legal recourse by which to challenge errors in the
disciplinary process when they occur. As illustrated in this Article, cases in
which disciplined students have prevailed both demonstrate that universities
can comply with Title IX while still ensuring fairness to the accused and
how a university can accomplish such. The accountability achieved through
litigation improves the reliability of disciplinary outcomes going forward
and decreases the possibility that a valid disciplinary outcome will later be
overturned on procedural grounds. It also mitigates the potential for Title
IX opponents to deploy examples of procedural error in an attempt to
demonstrate the statute’s incompatibility with adjudication.
As a matter of civil rights, Title IX mandates that federally funded
educational institutions must address reports of sexual assault. Before the
recent wave of enforcement on this issue, the only effective litigation and
liability colleges and universities had to fear came from lawsuits by disci-
plined students.185 Now there is an effective threat of administrative en-
forcement against colleges and universities that fail to protect the civil
rights of complainants. Together, the accountability mechanisms on both
sides work to ensure that colleges and universities chart a course up the fair
and workable middle.
185. See supra Part II.A (discussing the possibility for litigation by victims of sexual assault but
noting the high burden—deliberate indifference—for imposing liability).
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